私募投资基金与中小企业家双向选择的因素与运作过程分析(硕士)

私募投资基金与中小企业家双向选择的因素与运作过程分析(硕士)(论文35000字)
摘 要
随着社会经济的不断发展，改革开放的不断深入，中小型企业对我国社会的经济发展起到了越来越重要的作用，特别是在满足多层次多样化的社会性需求、发展社会经济、提高工作专业化水平、降低失业率等方面有着显著的意义。虽然，现阶段的中小型企业的重要性逐渐提升，但是中小型企业却因为自身的能力、人才、资金等多方面的限制仍存在很大的不足。例如，融资的方式比较单一，获得融资的涉及面较小，融资的耗费难以承受、融资的信用等问题都严重制约着中小型企业的发展。同时，从以上不足也可以知道，融资困难是当前中小型企业迫切需要处理的问题。就在最近几年内，PE行业在中国的发展达到了一个前所未有的高度，甚至可以说达到了“全民PE”的程度。从这里可以看出两方面的潜在含义。一方面，该行业具有很大的潜力，有良好的发展前景及内在价值。就我们所知，资本主义市场的波动性很大，但是这些波动性无疑都是资本家为了追逐利润价值所导致的。目前，中国市场中的股市及房市等市场，也成为了培养具有资本主义性质的投资者的摇篮。但是，PE行业的全民化，在某种程度上说明了该行业的足够吸引力及生机、活力。另一方面，PE行业并非出于一个比较冷静的交易环境中，出于该行业的人或多或少体现了浮躁的特点。现阶段的中国市场中，股市基金等投资行为逐渐呈现出资本主义市场的性质。不可否认，股权投资基金已经成为了多层次资本市场中不可缺少的一部分。同时，股权投资基金能够根据各种不同规模、地位、类型、盈利情况的企业在不同的风险情况下进行相应的融资时所需要的资金进行合理的分配，也能够保证企业在获得投资、汇集资本之后，将所得的融资进行有效的利用，特别是将资本用于高科技的技术、设备的使用等方面，促进高科技产业进行适当合理的资本反战。实际情况下，市场经济中的任意行业进行发展的过程中，无论处于完全或者不完全的竞争状况下，任意一个市场的参与者能够获得的信息必定有不同程度的不对称性。私募股权基金的投资者，是金融资本的代理人，因此有着“唯利是图”的商人性格以及“短期套利”的投资特性，立足于“乘法逻辑”的运营方式，将社会及产业的分散资源进行统一的集中整合，最终达到得到丰厚投资效益的目的。不同于私募股权基金的投资者，企业融资方看重与企业发展的任何机会，并不会简单采用扩大企业生产规模的方式促进企业的低速发展。在这个残酷的竞争市场中，浮躁的环境造就了高速的发展步伐，任意缓慢的发展都是不允许的。当一直以来不辞辛苦的实业家们发现了资本运作能够让企业的发展变得更加顺利，他们恍然大悟，如同发现金矿一样，不断寻求外部融资，这也成为他们的必然选择 。此外，PE投资者也开始与企业家进行合作，开展行的业务方式。利用博弈论的相关理论来对私募股权基金这种投资方式进行分析，可以得出比较形象和合理的结论。若讲 PE的运作分成融资环节、投资环节、管理环节以及退出环节，那么投资环节就是期中最为重要的环节，其最为主要的参与者为企业家和PE投资者。在这一环节中，这两者需要经历的过程有：项目的谈判过程 、项目具体交易方式的设计过程、签订投资合同的过程、交易利润的分配过等。在这些过程中，任何一个细节都是两者之间的博弈点，两者在投资环节进行多次的博弈之后，一般都能够获得一个看似比较均衡的结果。对于最终的利益得失，博弈的双方是能有能力进行单独的预测，即使有事先制定的投资协议来进行保障，这一目的也无法实现。在当今市场经济的体制下，不管行业属于完全竞争行业还是部分竞争行业 ，每一位参与者的信息是不对称的。私募股权基金的投资者作为这些金融资本的管理人，追求客观的利润，并希望能够 在短期内套利，利用自己的资本运作时资本得以成倍增长，并且有效的整合各方面的资源，如社会资源、产业资源等等，实现自身投资利润的最大化。与私募股权基金的投资者相对应的是企业的融资者，其 面对的产业给予往往是短暂的、易逝的，也深知不能单纯利用扩大生产这一传统方式来是企业得以缓慢发展，因为竞争激烈且易变得市场环境不允许他们以这样的方式经营，哪怕一时的落后都会造成全局的被动。进行资本运作无疑可以保证产业的高速可持续发展，而这也点醒了那些长期只知道埋头扎实苦干的实业家们，因此，他们都逐渐抬起头来寻找不断发展的机遇，而融资就是他们的首选。在这种情况下，PE投资者以及企业家之间的互动、交流与合作也开始出现了。 [资料来源：http://doc163.com]
本文借助于博弈理论对PE运作过程中的融资行为进行分析研究，在中国当前市场状况下，按照其在PE投资棋局中，分别对企业家与投资者进行分析，通过分析双方所获得的信息，衡量己方所应该采取的策略，或者共同攻击，或者分别对抗，促使博弈达到最优效果的过程。本文的分析研究有2个方面的作用，1、能够吸引大家对PE投资的关注，通过与投资者之间的博弈能够获得认知；2、分别从理论和实践2方面对投资者和企业家进行博弈，向人们揭示PE投资中各种决策的本质。

关键词： 创业企业，私募基金，博弈分析，双向选择
 
Abstract

KEYWORDS：Entrepreneurial businesses，private equity funds， game analysis， two-way choice

With the continuous development of social economy , the deepening of reform and opening up , small and medium enterprises on China's social and economic development has played an increasingly important role , especially in multi-level to meet the needs of diverse social , socio-economic development , improve working professional level , reducing the unemployment rate has a significant meaning. Although， at this stage of the importance of SMEs gradually improved, but small and medium enterprises , but because their ability , talent, capital , and many other restrictions are still significant deficiencies. For example, relatively simple way of financing, access to financing involves a small, unbearable cost of financing, credit financing and other issues are seriously restricting the development of SMEs. Meanwhile, you can know from the above shortcomings, difficulties in financing small and medium enterprises is an urgent need to deal with current issues . Just within the last few years, PE industry development in China has reached an unprecedented height, and even can be said to achieve a "universal PE" level. From here you can see two of the potential implications. On the one hand , the industry has great potential , with good growth prospects and intrinsic value . To our knowledge, the volatility of the capitalist market is large, but these are undoubtedly volatility capitalists in order to chase the value of profits caused. At present, China 's stock market and the housing market and other markets, has also become a training with the nature of capitalism investors cradle . However， PE industry all citizens , to some extent explains the industry attractive enough and vigor , vitality. On the other hand , PE industry not because of a relatively calm trading environment for the industry more or less reflects the impulsive characteristics. Stage of the Chinese market, the stock market funds and other investment behavior gradually showing the nature of the capitalist market . Admittedly , equity investment funds have become a multi-level capital market is an indispensable part . Meanwhile, the equity investment funds according to a variety of different size, status , type, profitability of the enterprises in the case of different risk financing accordingly required when a reasonable allocation of funds , but also to ensure that enterprises in obtaining investment capital together Thereafter, the resultant financing for effective use , especially of capital for high-tech technology, equipment use , etc., to promote high-tech industries are appropriate and reasonable capital antiwar . Practical cases , the market economy in any industry development process, regardless or incomplete in a fully competitive conditions, any one market participant can obtain the information must have different degrees of asymmetry. Private equity fund investors , the financial capital of the agent, so has a " mercenary " businessman character , and "short-term arbitrage " investment properties , based on the " multiplication logic" of the way they operate , the social and industrial uniform dispersion of resources centralized integration , and ultimately to obtain lucrative investment benefits. Unlike private equity fund investors , corporate finance and corporate development value any chance , and not simply adopt the way to expand the production scale of enterprises to promote the development of low speed . In this brutal competitive market environment created impetuous pace of development of high-speed , arbitrary slow development is not allowed. When industrialist who has been tirelessly discovered capital operation enables the development of enterprises to become more successful , they suddenly realized , as the discovery of gold , like , continue to seek external financing , which has become an inevitable choice for them . In addition, PE investors have begun to cooperate with entrepreneurs to carry out the line way of doing business . Use game theory to the theory that private equity funds investment analysis , comparison can be drawn image and reasonable conclusion . If you speak into the operation of PE financing links, investment links, management aspects and exit links, then the investment aspect is the most important part of the period , which is most of the key players for entrepreneurs and PE investors. In this session , both need to go through the process are: the project negotiation process , the project design process specific transactions , investment contracts signed in the process , the distribution of trading profits over and so on. In these processes , no detail is the game between the two points , both in the investment aspect of the game several times after seemingly are generally able to obtain a more balanced result. For the ultimate interests of the gains and losses, both games have the ability to be able to separate forecast , even with pre-established protocols for investment protection , this goal can not be achieved . In today's market economy system, regardless of the industry is a perfectly competitive industry is still part of the competition in the industry, every participant information is asymmetrical. Private equity fund investors as managers of these financial capital, the pursuit of the objective of the profits, and hopefully in the short term arbitrage, using their own capital to grow exponentially capital operation, and effective integration of various resources, such as social resources, industrial resources, etc. , to achieve their own investment profit maximization. And private equity fund investors are corresponding to the financing of enterprises , their faces tend to be short-lived given industry , perishable , also know can not simply use the traditional way to expand production to slow the development of enterprises , because the competitive market environment and easy to become such a way that does not allow them to operate , even if it will cause a momentary lag behind the global passive . Capital operation speed can undoubtedly ensure sustainable development of the industry , which also awoke only know those long buried industrialists solid work , so they have gradually raised his head constantly looking for opportunities in the development and financing that they of choice. In this case , PE investors and entrepreneurs to interact , exchange and cooperation have begun to appear. [资料来源：http://Doc163.com]
This means of game theory to PE during the operation of the financing behavior analysis and study, in China the current market conditions, in accordance with their PE investment chessboard, respectively, entrepreneurs and investors to analyze, through the analysis of information obtained by both sides, measure that should be taken in one's own policy, or common assault, or separately confrontation, prompting the game to achieve optimal effectiveness of the process. This analysis has two aspects of the role, one that is attractive to everyone on the PE investment concern, with investors able to get the game between cognition; 2, respectively, from the theoretical and practical aspects of the two investors and entrepreneurs for the game, to the people in a variety of PE investment decisions reveal the essence.
 
目    录
第一章 引言    1
第一节  本文的研究背景    1
第二节  本文的研究意义    3
第三节  文献综述    4 [来源：http://www.doc163.com]
一、企业的认知价值、企业价值    4
二、国外博弈分析方法对风险投资的研究    7
三、国内博弈分析方法对风险投资的研究    7
第二章 不对称信息和动态资本结构    9
第一节  信息揭示与动态博弈    9
第二节  动态资本结构    10
第三章 私募股权基金概况和主要的投资环节    14
第一节  私募股权基金的概况    14
一、私募投资基金的概念    14
二、私募投资基金的分类    14
三、私募投资基金的市场功能    15
四、中国私募基金的发展概况    16
五、外资私募基金在中国的发展情况    17
第二节  私募股权投资的主要环节    18
一、初步接触    19
二、商讨谈判    19
三、调查    19
四、签署投资协议    21
五、投资后的管理和监控    23

[资料来源：https://www.doc163.com]

第四章  PE投资者与企业家的博弈    29
第一节  PE投资者和企业家    29
一、投资周期    29
二、投资行业    29
三、投资企业    30
四、 参与管理    30
五、退出途径    30
六、盈利模式    30
第二节  博弈局中人的愿景    32
一、寻找纳什均衡    32
二、实现“正和博弈”    33
第五章  案例模型分析    35
第一节  案例研究的目的    35
第二节  案例模型研究分析    35
第三节 案例研究结果    37
第六章  本文结论    40
参考文献    41
致谢    42 [资料来源：Doc163.com]